If NATO and the Warsaw Pact Went to War in the Cold War, Would the Winner Have Enforced Their Ideals on the Loser?

The concept of any party winning a full-scale war during the Cold War era is highly unlikely. The doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) made clear that neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact had the military capability to overrun the other completely. In this article, we delve deeper into the factors and implications of such a scenario.

Imbalance in Nuclear Power in the 1950s and 1960s

During the early Cold War (1950s), there was a significant advantage in nuclear weapons capabilities between the NATO and the United States against the Warsaw Pact. The US and NATO had more strategic weapon systems and a larger stockpile of nuclear warheads. For instance, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 showcased the vulnerability of the Warsaw Pact, as they had no substantial strategic weapon systems to effectively counter the advanced weapon systems of NATO and the US.

Russia faced a significant challenge in acquiring strategic weapons. The placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962 was a desperate attempt to obtain parity with the US. This move was made to reduce the perceived nuclear advantage held by the United States. However, the US was able to detect and neutralize this threat, as evidenced by the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

During the same period, the Soviet Union was still developing its strategic arsenal and coming to terms with their limited striking power. As a result, if a full-scale war had broken out, the Warsaw Pact would would likely have been destroyed by a combination of bomber and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) strikes against their vulnerable missile sites and other critical infrastructure.

Shift in the Balance of Power by the Late 1960s and Early 1970s

However, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, the balance of power shifted significantly in favor of the Warsaw Pact. The Strategic Rocket Forces of the Soviet Union began deploying a large number of modern and more advanced systems that provided them with both parity and an eventual advantage in terms of the number of warheads capable of hitting the US and NATO. This shift was documented in First Strike Part 1, a video that discusses how one side could achieve a successful first strike.

Given the significant advancements in missile technology and proliferation, it is plausible that the Soviet Union could have achieved a successful first strike capable of severely damaging the US and NATO infrastructure. However, such an action would have resulted in significant destruction and loss of power on both sides. The complete devastation at home would have made ideological enforcement next to impossible.

Challenges of First Strike and Survival

The First Strike Part 1 video, despite its commercial intent to sell the MX Peacekeeper ICBM, provides a comprehensive argument about the feasibility of a first strike. However, it is clear that any successful first strike would have been followed by an immediate and devastating counterattack.

Moreover, the concept of a "winner" in such a scenario is debatable. Both sides would have suffered catastrophic losses, leaving little room for any form of ideological enforcement immediately following the conflict. It would likely take a decade or more for nations to rebuild and establish a new basis for ideological discussion.

Therefore, in conclusion, while the idea of a first strike remains a topic of interest, the Cold War as it existed was built on principles of mutual deterrence and the belief that any full-scale nuclear conflict would result in mutual annihilation. This made the enforcement of any ideals following such a conflict highly improbable.